

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 29-38

STRATEGIC REVIEW
FALL 1979

CRAL 04 SULLIVAN, David
ORGI SALT
Orig under 1.04

A SALT DEBATE: CONTINUED SOVIET DECEPTION

DAVID S. SULLIVAN



THE AUTHOR: Mr. Sullivan is Legislative Assistant for Military Affairs to Senator Gordon J. Humphrey. He served as a strategic and Soviet foreign policy analyst in the Central Intelligence Agency from 1971 to 1978. A graduate of Harvard University and Columbia University, he has written extensively on international relations and military affairs. He is active in the U.S. Marine Corps Reserve.

IN BRIEF

Not only was the United States deceived by the Soviet Union in SALT I, but that deception, which has since been acknowledged by former American officials who were its victims, is compounded in the SALT II Treaty. Soviet deception has embraced not only negotiation tactics, but also active concealment of offensive programs. The triumph of those tactics is a SALT II Treaty that seems to guarantee an overwhelming Soviet strategic superiority, with all of its implications, for the 1980s.

Mr. Slocombe's rebuttal to this author's original article is welcome, because controversy can help to illuminate the issues of the day—especially as complex an issue as SALT. Moreover, this reply permits an elaboration of some of the themes expressed in the original article.

The reader should be aware of what is probably a fundamental philosophical disagreement between Mr. Slocombe and the present author about the political significance of strategic nuclear power. Thus, an Adelphi Paper composed by Mr. Slocombe in 1971 addressed the implications of U.S.-Soviet strategic parity, but it carried the underlying theme that the United States could safely tolerate a decline of its strategic posture into a form of minimum deterrence.¹ By contrast, I believe that the United States should maximize its strategic power in order to

sustain its technological lead and to ensure the "extended deterrent" over U.S. alliance commitments in Europe and Asia. If U.S. strategic superiority is irrevocably forfeited, however, then the maintenance of world peace demands that we settle for nothing less than a strategic equality that is strictly applied to all categories of strategic power. A corollary belief is that, while arms control can be a vital element in shoring up an increasingly unstable international system, it can play this stabilizing role only if negotiated agreements adhere strictly to the principles of equality and mutual restraint.

The Soviet Union's SS-19 Deception

The crux of Mr. Slocombe's critique is directed to what I deemed in my article a blatant case of Soviet deception in SALT I: namely, the